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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-4615
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KELVIN L. JONES
a/k/a Mike Smith
*Michael A. Orozco,
Appellant
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), Fed. R. App. P.)
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(No. 2-10-cr-00366-001)
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 15, 2012
____________
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 29, 2012)
____________
OPINION
____________
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Michael Orozco appeals the $200 sanction imposed against him by the District
Court for his tardiness and his failure to notify the court of a potential conflict with
another court appearance. Orozco argues that the sanction was improper because his
conduct was not egregious, he did not act in bad faith, and he was not afforded due
process by the District Court. Though we recognize the deference we must afford the
District Court‟s decision, we will reverse.
I.
We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are
essential to our disposition. In November 2011, attorney Michael Orozco was
representing Kelvin Jones, the defendant in a criminal case in the District of New Jersey.
The District Court held a restitution hearing in Jones‟s case that was scheduled for 9:30
a.m., but did not begin until 11:00 a.m. At 11:54 a.m., the court called for a “short
recess” that was to last until 12:15 p.m. Appendix (“App.”) 128. Orozco had a hearing
scheduled in front of a different District Judge at 12:00 p.m. During the recess of the
Jones restitution hearing, Orozco attempted to inform the judge presiding over the
second hearing that he was delayed in the Jones hearing, but was unsuccessful.
Orozco‟s office received a telephone call from a courtroom deputy informing him he
needed to appear for the second hearing, so he proceeded to the other courtroom.
Though he attempted to extricate himself from the second hearing, he was not given
permission to leave that hearing and was not able to return to the restitution hearing by
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12:15. Because of the delay in Orozco‟s return from the recess, the District Judge left
the bench and the restitution hearing did not continue until 12:44 p.m.
Later that afternoon, Orozco was held in contempt of court for his tardiness to the
restitution hearing and ordered to pay $200. The contempt order was later vacated, but
the District Court scheduled a hearing to determine whether Orozco should be
sanctioned pursuant to the court‟s inherent authority. The District Court informed
Orozco that he could not call witnesses, and clarified that the hearing would determine
whether “the Court should impose a monetary sanction on Mr. Orozco for his failure to
appear as directed before this Court at 12:15 p.m. on November 9, 2011 and for his
failure to timely notify the Court of a time conflict with another proceeding prior to that
time.” App. 5-6. After the hearing, the District Court imposed a $200 sanction
pursuant to its inherent power.
II. 1
In determining whether to reverse a district court‟s imposition of sanctions under
its inherent power, we review for abuse of discretion. Republic of Philippines v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994).
Though the Supreme Court has recognized courts‟ inherent power to impose
sanctions as a means to control litigants, it has also warned that “[b]ecause of their very
potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). With this admonition in mind, we have set forth
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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some guideposts to direct district courts in the exercise of their inherent power. We have
explained that district courts “should be guided by the same considerations that guide
[them] in the imposition of sanctions under the Federal Rules.” Westinghouse, 43 F.3d at
74. When exercising the power, courts must first explain why the conduct at issue
warrants sanction. Id. Then, they must consider the gravity of the wrongdoing, whether
there was a pattern of wrongdoing, and whether the wrongdoing “actually prejudices the
wrongdoer‟s opponent or hinders the administration of justice.” Id. Also, any mitigating
factors that exist must be taken into account. Id. After performing the required
evaluation, district courts should consider the permissible sanctions available and
“explain why less severe alternatives to the sanction imposed are inadequate or
inappropriate.” Id.
Though we have not often had occasion to determine whether to uphold a district
court‟s imposition of sanctions, we have several times echoed the cautionary sentiment
expressed in Chambers. In Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2001), we
reviewed the district court‟s imposition of sanctions (which included attorneys‟ fees and
costs of the sanctions motion) against an attorney for “four uses of the word „fuck,‟ . . .
and a post-verdict letter in which [the attorney] concurred with a juror who described an
expert witness as a „Nazi.‟” Id. at 237. We clarified that typically a court‟s inherent
power should only be exercised when conduct is egregious, and then concluded that the
district court had abused its discretion. Id. at 238; see also Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d
1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Generally, a court‟s inherent power should be reserved for
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those cases in which the conduct of a party or an attorney is egregious and no other basis
for sanctions exist.”).
Here, Orozco‟s conduct was irresponsible — he clearly should have informed the
District Court of his conflicting hearing, particularly where his appearance at the
conflicting hearing created the probability that the restitution hearing would be delayed.
However, we do not believe the conduct was so egregious as to warrant the sanction
imposed. While Orozco‟s tardiness may have slightly hindered the administration of
justice due to the delay it caused, there was no apparent pattern of wrongdoing or creation
of prejudice to other parties. Most importantly, the gravity of his wrongdoing was
minimal, especially considering the mitigating factors present here.
Thus, while we give significant weight to district courts‟ need to “preserve and
protect their essential functions,” Westinghouse, 43 F.3d at 73, we conclude that the
District Court abused its discretion in imposing the $200 sanction.
III.
In accordance with the foregoing, we will reverse the judgment of the District
Court.
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